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DEFENCE PRACTICE AMOUNTING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 
Regina v. Doz - 12 C.C.C. (3d) 200 
Alberta Court of Appeal, April 1984. 
A Mr. Woitt was arrested for driving while his ability to do so was 
impaired by alcohol. He had no identification on him and wishing to 
avoid the consequences of other outstanding traffic matters, he gave 
the name and address of a friend as being his. He was later released 
on a promise to appear. The document was made out for Mr. Hutchinson, 
the friend, and Mr. Woitt signed that name to the document. This 
false identity was continued when Woitt was photographed and finger-
printed under the provisions of the Identification of Criminals Act. 
Mr. Woitt went to see the accused, a lawyer who primarily practises 
criminal law. Mr. Woitt told all and a meeting of the accused, Mr. 
Woitt, and Mr. Hutchinson was arranged. This resulted, despite the 
total conflict of interest, that both signed a retainer for the 
accused to represent them. The accused, fully aware of all facts, 
presented Mr. Hutchinson as the man charged with impaired driving and 
represented him at a trial at which all facts as they occurred in 
regards to Mr. Woitt's arrest were adduced in evidence. The 
constable, when asked to identify the impaired driver he had 
encountered, said he recognized no one in the Courtroom as the person 
he apprehended. The judge then asked defence counsel, the accused: 
"Is your client here Mr. Doz?" The accused replied: "Mr. Hutchinson 
is here" (of course, Mr. Hutchinson's name appeared on the 
information). In cross examination the accused asked the police 
officer, while pointing at Mr. Hutchinson: " ••• was that the man you 
charged that evening?" The officer repeated that he did not recognize 
Hutchinson as the person he arrested. The accused then addressed the 
Court and said if the Judge found there was sufficient identification 
to convict Hutchinson, he would call his client who would tell the 
Court where he was on the evening in question. When the trial judge 
said: "tell it to the Court of Appeal, I find the accused guilty", the 
accused changed his mind and said he wanted to adduce evidence in 
defence. He called Mr. Hutchinson who, of course, testified that he 
was on the evening in question at a place other than where Mr. Woitt 
was arrested. When Mr. Hutchinson was asked how he learned of these 
proceedings he said that his sister had "reemed him out" at a party 
for being on the Court docket for impaired driving. He then had 
retained Mr. Doz, the accused, who had confirmed that his sister was 
correct. The prosecutor showed Mr. Hutchinson the mug shot of Mr. 
Woitt and asked if he knew who that was. He replied: "It's not me 
anyway". Despite the fact that Hutchinson and Woitt were friends he 
answered: "No, not that I recall" when asked if he ever had seen the 
individual before. Defence Counsel (the accused) lamented how 
unfortunate it was that Mr. Hutchinson had been compelled to present a 
defence, and the Judge dismissed the case but suggested that an 
investigation should be conducted. 
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Hutchinson told his parents what he had done. They made him aware 
that he had committed perjury and retained counsel for their son. 
Consequently Hutchinson told police the whole distorted story. When 
Woitt was interviewed he confessed also. 
Woitt was charged with personation and failing to appear on the 
impaired driving charge. He was sentenced to four months. Hutchinson 
was not charged with anything. Mr. Doz, the lawyer, was convicted of 
being a party to the offences of: 
1. Personation; 
2. Obstruction, perversion or defection of the course of justice; 
and 
3. Perjury. 
He appealed the convictions. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal held that when the trial was conducted in 
which Hutchinson acted the part of the person charged with the 
offence, the "motorist" who was apprehended on the night in question 
was, for all intents and purposes, the accused; not Hutchinson. This 
as Doz and Hutchinson as well as Woitt (the motorist) knew of the 
charade. Doz claimed that his legal ethics had precluded him from 
stating what he knew, namely, that the accused (the motorist) was not 
in the courtroom. These assertions, said the Court of Appeal, were 
unbelievable and incredible. As an officer of the court, Doz' s 
primary duty was not to deliberately mislead the court. Said the 
Justices in respect to obstruction of justice: 
"By his conduct he (Doz, the defence lawyer) was not 
only guilty of conduct unbecoming a barrister, but also 
of the criminal offence of attempting to obstruct 
justice as charged". 
The Court of Appeal held that all of the elements that led to a 
conviction of obstructing justice were the same as those adduced to 
seek convictions of personation. Therefore, a conditional stay of 
proceedings was directed on the charge of personation. Should Doz win 
a further appeal on the obstruction charge the judicial stay in 
personation would be lifted. 
In respect to the conviction on the perjury charge, Doz' appeal was 
dismissed. Although Hutchinson was called to testify "on the spur of 
the moment" he lied as Doz expected him to do. 
Appeal allowed in part only. 
* * * * * 
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INTERCEPTING A PRISONER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION -
PRIVATE COMMUNICATION - WARNING POSTED THAT CALLS MAY BE MONITORED 
Regina v. Rodney - 12 C.C.C. (3d) 195 
British Columbia Supreme Court, April 1984. 
The accused was in a provincial correctional institute awaiting to be 
tried for murder. A correctional officer saw the accused using the 
telephone on one ot' the tiers. As he seemed unusually agitated the 
officer went to the director's office and listened in on the accused's 
conversation on the monitoring system. The officer recognized the 
accused's voice but not that of the woman he was having a conversation 
with. The woman spoke a German type language while the accused's part 
of the communication was in English. The conversation was monitored 
but not taped and the officer made notes of what the accused said. 
Whatever that was, it must have been of interest to the Crown as it 
was adduced in evidence at the murder trial. The defence, of course, 
objected to the admissibility of the evidence despite the fact that 
above the telephone the accused used, was a warning saying: "All 
personal calls may be monitored". The Crown claimed that the accused 
was the originator of the monitored communication that was adduced in 
evidence (only what he said was presented) and the sign made it 
reasonable for him to expect that his communication would be inter-
cepted. Therefore, the communication was not private (see definition 
in s. 178.1 C.C.) and its admissibility in evidence not subject to the 
provisions of the Privacy Act contained in the Criminal Code. The 
defence, of course, argued that the communication was private, the 
interception therefore unlawful and that without the consent of the 
accused or the woman he spoke to the evidence given by the correction-
al officer was inadmissible. 
The test whether it was reasonable for the accused to believe that his 
call was going to be intercepted is an objective one. That means that 
it is not what the accused believed at the time but what a reasonable 
person may have thought in the circumstances. The Crown attempted to 
persuade the Court to hold that ••• "a reasonable inmate standing in 
the shoes of the accused would have read the signs" that all phones 
are subject to monitoring.. The Court did not agree and held: 
"On the whole of the evidence, I am not satisfied that 
the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that 
it was reasonable for the accused, using an objective 
test of reas~nableness to expect that his telephone con-
versation with the woman to whom he was speaking would 
be listened to by any person other than the woman to 
whom he was speaking". 
Communication ruled inadmissible. 
* * * * * 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROPRIETY OF PRESUMPTION THAT GOODS 
OBTAINED BY N.S.F. CHEQUE WERE BEGOTTEN BY A FALSE PRETENCE 
Regina v. Bunka - 12 C.C.C. (3d) 437 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. 
The accused issued an N.S.F. cheque for goods he purchased. The 
cheque was presented for payment within a reasonable time and in 
accordance to s. 320(4) C.C. it was presumed that the goods were 
obtained by a false pretence. The accused appealed the conviction 
claiming that the presumption violates s. 11 and 7 of the Charter, 
which spell out respectively the well-known presumption of innocence 
and that we cannot be deprived of life, liberty and security of the 
person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice;, 
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal applied the test suggested by their 
Ontario counterpart to determine the propriety of statutory and common 
law presumptions of guilt. The Justices held that the presumed fact 
(that the goods were obtained by a false pretence) and the facts 
prerequisite to the presumption (presentation of cheque within a 
reasonable time; dishonoured due to insufficient funds; absence of 
evidence that accused had reasonable grounds for believing that cheque 
would be honoured) had a logical connection and relationship. The 
prerequisite grounds made the presumed fact more than probable. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Presumption not contrary to Charter. 
* * * * * 
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THE DEFENCE OF NECESSITY 
CAN ONE BE EXCUSED FROM HAVING COMMITTED AN OFFENCE IF HE FELT IT WAS 
NECESSARY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO COMMIT THE OFFENCE? 
Perka, Nelson, Hines, Johnson and The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, 
October 1984. 
The accused were on the Pacific Ocean en route to Alaska with a cargo 
of $7 ,000,000 worth of marijuana. They were sailing outside the 
Canadian 200 mile limit, when, according to their testimony, they 
encountered mechanical problems and heavy weather. The captain 
decided to put in a bay on the west coast of Vancouver Island, offload 
and make repairs. Police moved in, made arrests and seized ship and 
cargo. The accused successfully raised the defence of necessity and 
were acquitted of importing a narcotic and possession for the purpose 
of trafficking. The B. C. Court of Appeal ordered a new trial and the 
accused appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
There were several grounds for appeal but the kernel one was whether 
or not there exists in Canada a defence of necessity and, if so, when 
is it available. 
This case seems a landmark decision in that it was not certain whether 
the defence of necessity existed in Canada. The British common law 
was of no help as legal scholars and authors cannot agree if in 
England such a defence is recognized. Yet, for centuries the courts 
have responded that a man may be excused from committing a crime if he 
had no choice in rejecting a greater evil. 
One crucial aspect of this "ill defined and elusive" defence has 
always been whether we can afford such a legal luxery. One can 
imagine all the innovative fabrications that could "very easily become 
simply a mask for anarchy". On the other hand when a man commits a 
crime to prevent a more serious wrong or harm, should he then not be 
at least excused from committing the less pernicious one? 
When Dr. Morgentaler raised this defence, he argued that procuring a 
miscarriage contrary to the Criminal Code was an act of necessity to 
prevent graver evil to the woman. When this issue reached the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 197 6*, the defence of necessity was no 
longer the kernel issue. The Supreme Court's opinion was, that if the 
defence existed, it was not available to Dr. Morgentaler in the 
circumstances. Said the Court about the defence of necessity: 
"If such a principle exists, it can go no further than 
to justify non-compliance in urgent situations of clear 
and imminent peril when compliance with the law is 
demonstrably impossible". 
* 1 CSRX (1976) 
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These words apparently triggered a belief that the defence exists and 
it was since successfully raised in.four cases. 
The Supreme Court of Canada blamed all the ambiguity about this 
defence on the Courts having failed to determine the distinction 
between two related principles. The one is where a person for practi-
cal reasons in an emergency situation, is justified to break the 
letter of the law to avoid a greater harm. The other is where for 
humanitarian reasons, it is, in an emergency, excusable to break the 
law if compliance would impose an intolerable burden on the accused. 
In criminal theory there is a distinction between "justification" and 
"excuse". 
"A justification challenges the wrongfulness of an 
action which technically constitutes a crime •••• " "In 
contrast, an excuse concedes the wrongfulness of the 
action but asserts that the circumstances under which it 
was done are such that it ought not to be contributed to 
the actor". 
Police may be "justified" in shooting a hostage-taker. The action is 
in certain circumstances rightful. "The concept of punishment often 
seems incompatible with the social approval bestowed on the doer". 
Necessity goes to excuse conduct, not to justify it. 
When a person comm.its a crime while drunk, mentally ill, or sleep 
walking, no matter how we disapprove of his criminal act, the law may 
consider it an "excuse" sufficient not to impose punishment. For a 
criminal act to be "excused", it must be one of "moral 
involuntariness". 
If one goes through the Criminal Code, a number of "excuses" and 
··justifications" for the commission of offences can be found. These 
are comm.only raised as a defence or the wording of the codified 
definition of the crime may exclude "justification" or the defence of 
"excuse". However, in terms of the defence of necessity the statutes 
are not exhaustive. Those that are valid ··excuses" but not on our 
statute books, are labelled the "residual defence of necessity". 
Having said this, the Court dealt with the limitations of the "greater 
good theory" with the obvious objective to prevent exploitation of 
this defence. The Court prefaced that part of the judgement by 
saying: 
• • • I retain the skepticism I expressed in Morgen-
taler. It is still my opinion that, no system of 
positive law can recognize any principle which would 
entitle a person to violate the law because on his view 
the law conflicted with some higher social value". 
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Reiterating the meaning of "the excuse of necessity" the Court said 
that humane criminal law cannot hold people to the strict 
obedience of laws in emergency situations where normal human 
instincts, whether self preservation or of altruism, overwhelmingly 
impel disobedience". Although the act is still a crime in the circum-
stances, it is excusable. There cannot be praise for the act, but 
only pardon. After all, despite the overwhelming urge to commit the 
offence, in the circumstances the act was voluntary. 
The Court gave a very vivid example of this theory. A man can find 
himself lost in the elements and come upon a dwelling. To avoid 
freezing to death he breaks in. He may well help himself to 
provisions and damage the house or its content to make a fire. Though 
he voluntarily broke in and committed mischief, "realistically his act 
is not a voluntary one". His choice was not a true choice at all, 
said the Court. It simply amounts to "moral or normative involuntari-
ness". 
Then the Court established the limitations of this defence of neces-
sity. The Supreme Court, probably concerned that the defence would be 
abused prefaced this part of their reasons for judgment by emphasizing 
that it must "be strictly controlled and scrupulously limited to 
situations that correspond to its underlying rationale". Again the 
Morgentaler case was used as an example where the defence of necessity 
was not available. Said the Court: 
"At a minimum the situation must be so emergent and the 
peril must be so pressing that normal human instincts 
cry out for action and make a counsel of patience 
unreasonable". 
The wrongful act must be unavoidable and there must not be a legal way 
out. Having established that, a Court must consider the proportional-
ity of the offence to decide if the defence is available. 
"No rational criminal justice system, no matter how 
humane or liberal, could excuse the infliction of a 
greater harm to allow the actor to avert a lesser evil". 
Then the court dealt with the inevitable question about the 
availability of this defence for a person who got into the predicament 
(where he of necessity committed an of fence) because of his own 
negligence; or if one can have the benefit of this defence when he, 
like in this case, was or was about to commit a crime. The accused 
claimed that when they decided to head for shore to preserve their 
lives, they were outside Canadian waters. Therefore, as far as 
Canadian law is concerned, they were, when the necessity arose not 
doing anything illegal. The ref ore, the Crown's argument that the 
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defence of necessity was not available to the accused on account of 
their criminal activity at the time, did not receive too much 
attention. Nevertheless the Court answered the question and offered 
an opinion that it had grave doubts that illegal activities of a 
person at the time the necessitous circumstances arise deprive that 
person of the defence of necessity for his responsive criminal 
action. The two acts are separate. After all, the original unlawful 
behaviour is punishable. Said the Court: 
"Necessity goes to excuse conduct, not to justify it. 
Where it is found to apply it carries with it no 
implicit indication of the deed to which it attaches. 
That cannot be over emphasized".* 
The only time that "fault" on the part of an accused for the emergent 
situation is relevant to the availability of the defence of necessity, 
is when it was "clearly foreseeable to a reasonable observer". Then 
what confronted the accused was not the kind of emergency intended to 
excuse responsive action. If he ought to have known that his actions 
were likely to create an emergency to which he would have to react 
unlawfully, then his reaction is not "moral involuntariness". 
Now that we seem to have the defence of necessity, is there an 
additional burden on the police and Crown to prove in all cases that 
what the accused did was not in response to an emergent situation 
which would excuse his wrong doing? Does the absence of such evidence 
in the Crown's case result in an acquittal? 
The Court responded that normally, voluntariness may be presumed. In 
regards to the defence of necessity, the accused needs not· to prove 
anything. However, should an accused through his own witnesses or 
cross-examination of Crown witnesses place sufficient evidence before 
the Court to raise an issue that an emergent situation caused him to 
act, then the onus is on the Crown "to meet that issue". Where the 
charges are under the Narcotic Control Act the same principle applies, 
despite section 7(2) of that Act. 
This Supreme Court of Canada's decision on the defence of necessity 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. The defence of necessity should be recognized in Canada as an 
excuse (not justification); 
* This view contradicts the views expressed by the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal in the nearly identical case of R. -v. Salvadore (1981) 59 
c.c.c. (2d) 521 and of the U. S. National Commission on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws. 
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2. The moral involuntariness, which is the criterion, implies no 
vindication of the wrongful act; 
3. The moral involuntariness must be measured on society's expecta-
tion of normal resistance to pressure; 
4. Negligent, criminal, or immoral activities at the time the 
emergent situation arose, does not disentitle an accused to the 
defence of necessity; 
5. Any activities or evidence that the wrongful act was not truly 
involuntary or the existence of a legal alternative does disen-
title an accused to the defence of necessity; 
6. The involuntary wrongful act must be inevitable, unavoidable and 
afford no reasonable opportunity for lawful alternative action; 
7. The wrongful act must have been taken to avoid an immediate 
peril; and/or 
8. When the accused adduces sufficient evidence to raise the issue, 
the onus is on the Crown to melt it beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In this case, the trial judge did not instruct the jury to consider if 
there was a legal way out of the predicament the accused found them-
selves in and which they claimed caused them to enter Canadian 
waters. Although the Court did not say so, they had for instance the 
opportunity and equipment to call the Coast Guard for assistance but 
chose not to do so. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Order for a new trial upheld. 
* * * * * 
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IS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER THE EQUIVALENT OF A STEPDAUGHTER, FOSTER 
DAUGHTER OR FEMALE WARD? - DISCRIMINATION 
Regina v. Mcintosh - 13 c.c.c. (ed) 130 
Manitoba Court of Appeal, May 1984. 
The accused married a woman who had, at the time of their marriage, a 
two year old girl born out of wedlock. The accused was not the 
natural father. Shortly after the marriage the accused adopted the 
girl. When the girl reached the age of sixteen he had sexual inter-
course with her on several occasions. When she was 18 years of age 
the accused was charged under section 153 C.C. which prohibits a male 
person to have illicit sexual intercourse with his step or foster 
daughter or his female ward. The Crown selected to call the complain-
ant a foster daughter in the indictment. The trial judge acquitted 
the accused holding that the girl was not a foster daughter. The 
Crown appealed this decision. 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal dealt firstly with the application of 
"the narrow construction doctrine". In 1951 already, the Supreme 
Court of Canada* held that the rigorous pursuit to apply the letter of 
penal laws, had lost its force. The Court instructed the judiciary to 
consider not the semantics of statute but to interpret the language of 
the legislature "honestly and faithfully" and in such a way that it 
can remedy what it was intended to remedy and to promote its object. 
Section 11 of the Interpretation Act gives similar instructions to our 
Courts as it says: 
"Every enactment shall be deemed remedial and shall be 
given such fair, 
interpretation as 
objects". 
large and liberal construction and 
best ensures attainment of its 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, after examining also the French version 
of section 153 c.c., concluded that the section intends to provide to 
an entire class of female persons "protection from their male 
guardians, be they permanent, temporary or adoptive guardians". The 
mischief the section prohibits is an act of sexual intercourse by a 
male guardian or parent. 
The most interesting submission in this case was the claim by defence 
counsel that section 153 c.c. is contrary to the Canadian constitution 
(s. 15 Charter**) as it discriminates against "male persons". The 
Criminal Code section protects female persons only and creates a 
criminal liability for male persons only. Unless nature dictates that 
only one sex is able to commit the offence or that because of such 
* R. v. Robinson et. al. 100 c.c.c. 
** See s. 32(2) of the Charter. 
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dictate only one sex is in need of protection, then the law prima 
facie discriminates and should be declared invalid. 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal in rejecting this submission, said that 
the law does discriminate not from an Act of Parliament but from an 
act of mother nature. Also: 
"A male person can force himself into a female person to 
the extent of penetrating her body with his penis". 
The reverse is quite impossible concluded the Court. All a woman can 
do is seduce a male person to do so to her. Therefore, the defence 
position was labelled a "vein attempt" to force equality by mixing 
"apples with oranges". 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Comment: Other Courts may well respond differently to the question of 
section 153 c.c. being discriminatory. 
The repeal of the "rape" section and including such act in sexual 
assaults, was likely part of cleaning up apparent discriminatory law. 
Rape could, in terms of being the principal offender, only be commit-
ted by a male person. To say that this was the result of an act of 
"mother nature" was a sound argument where it involved sexual inter-
course without consent. However, if one examines the means that 
rendered a man to be criminally liable for having sexual intercourse 
with a female person with her consent, one cannot help but conclude 
that a woman was equally capable of forcing the act upon a nian by the 
same means. Although submissions of discrimination in regard to the 
definition of rape did fail, it seems fair to say it was only a matter 
of time before "rape" as it was, would have been found discriminatory. 
Apparently the Manitoba Court of Appeal found that section 153 c.c. 
does not discriminate in that a man only is capable of an act which 
previously was known as rape. Is it not fair to say that if a male 
guardian "rapes" his step or adopted daughter the appropriate charge 
would be one of sexual assault? Rape, as we have learned to under-
stand the meaning of that act, appears not to be the gravaman of the 
offence created by section 153 C.C. It seems that the illicit sexual 
intercourse with a step or adopted daughter is the kernel of the 
offence whether outright consent, seduction or intimidation is 
involved. If that is so it should be noted that a stepmother is 
equally capable to seduce or intimidate a stepson or adopted son. One 
wonders if Parliament, by enacting section 153 c.c. intended to create 
surrogate incest. If so, male children ought to be protected equally 
to those of the female pursuasion, while it matters not if it is a 
step-father or step-mother who sexually exploits the child placed in 
their charge. It seems not unlikely that section 153 C.C. will be 
"nutured" by Parliament in the not too distant future. If not, it may 
eventually be ruled inconsistent with section 15 of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
ABOUT "UNREASONABLE SEARCH" 
Hunter v. Southam Inc., Supreme Court of Canada, October 1984. 
In the last volume I welcomed the views of the B. C. Court of Appeal* 
on "unreasonable search", but warned that these views could be super-
seded by the Supreme Court of Canada. This Court of the last resort 
has now interpreted some fundamental aspects of section 8 of the 
Charter (unreasonable search) and they do not coincide with the views 
of the B. C. Court of Appeal. What is to be remembered is that the 
two cases (Hamill and Hunter v. Southam) are in terms of circumstances 
distinct in that in Hamill the constitutionality of writs of assis-
tance and section 10 N.C.A. were challenged while in the Hunter case 
the statutory provision for, in essence, a warrantless search by the 
Combines Investigation Branch became subject to an application for an 
injunction. Both challenges were argued in light of the constitution-
al right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. 
However, despite the distinction in circumstances, should the views of 
the Supreme Court of Canada as expressed in Hunter have preceded the 
Hamill case the decisions of the B. C. Court of Appeal would likely 
have been different. As a matter of fact on some points explicitly 
made by the B. c. Court of Appeal the Supreme Court was equally 
explicit in expressing different views. One major point in 
particular, was seen differently by the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
B. c. Court of Appeal steered clear from law that has resulted from 
the Fourth Amendment to the u. s. Constitution; the Supreme Court of 
Canada, however, held that in view of the objectives of section 8 of 
the Charter and the U. S. Fourth Amendment, that the U. S. approach 
"is equally appropriate in construing the protections in s. 8 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms". This could, particularly if the 
Charter is considered to be complementary rather than supplementary, 
open a can of legal worms (whatever way you want to take this, the 
expression seems to fit). 
Members of the Combines Investigation Branch conducted a rather 
thorough search of the offices of the Edmonton Journal, a newspaper 
owned by Southam Inc. Their objective, of course, was to find 
documentary evidence of of fences under the Combines Investigation 
Act. This Act provides that the Director of the Branch or any 
representatives authorized by him, may enter any premises on which he 
believes there may be evidence relevant to an investigation. 
* The queen v. Hamill Page 26 Volume 17 of this publication. 
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Apparently to prevent abuses and arbitrary searches the director or 
his representatives must produce before searching, a certificate from 
a member of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, which can be 
granted, like a search warrant, on an ~ parte application by the 
Director. 
The lawyers for Southam Inc. argued that the search was, for all 
intents and purposes a warrantless search. The procedures prescribed 
in the Combines Investigation Act to have a search authorized, is 
proscribed by the Charter, which guarantees us, within reasonable 
limits, the right to be protected from unreasonable search and 
seizure. The provisions under the Combines Investigation Act, to 
carry out searches, hardly ensures appropriate consideration for 
authorization for such search the Southam lawyers argued. They had 
applied for an injunction which appeal ended up in the Alberta Court 
of Appeal. This court ordered that the seized documents be sealed in 
containers pending this appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada firstly addressed how the Courts must 
approach the Charter. The Court recognized that there has always been 
growth in terms of law protecting the rights and freedoms of individu-
als. However, now that we have entrenched those rights and freedoms 
in our constitution and have declared that they are the supreme law of 
Canada, they must receive greater attention and consideration. We 
have not reached the ultimate of civilization and we must encourage 
and allow growth and development over time. This constitution was 
"drafted with an eye to the future" said the Court. It is not to be 
seen like Canada's last will and testament, the end of something, but 
rather as a framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental 
powers . It is simply a firm commitment and a most significant stage 
in the continued building of constitutional evolutionary process. 
To best explain the views of our Supreme Court, their findings are, in 
point form, as follows: 
1. In Canada we have been inclined to use the provisions of the 
trespass laws to weigh the propriety of governmental searches and 
seizures of property. In other words, if one (if it was not for 
the warrant) would be a trespasser at the location to be 
searched, the document is a necessary ingredient. Section 8 of 
the Charter has not destroyed this concept but broadened it. 
Holding like their u. S. counterparts, the Justices of our 
Supreme Court were unanimous in saying that section 8 does not 
just protect places, but people and their privacy. This creates 
and describes the scales on which we must from hereon in weigh 
the propriety of a warrant or the search and seizure of any 
property. The reasons for judgment record: 
"The guarantee of security from unreasonable search and 
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seizure only protects a reasonable expectation. This 
limitation on the right guaranteed by Section 8, 
whether it is expressed negatively as freedom from un-
reasonable search and seizure, or positively as an 
entitlement to reasonable expectation of privacy, 
indicates that an assessment must be made as to whether 
in a particular situation the public's interest in 
being left alone by government must give way to the 
government's interest in intruding on the individual's 
privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of 
law enforcement". 
2. Whether a search or seizure was reasonable is usually determined 
after the fact, when it is deliberated at trial if there was an 
infringement of a person's rights or freedoms. However, there is 
now an obligation placed on us by section 8 of the Charter to 
prevent such unreasonable intrusions.. By means of a warrant the 
judiciary certify that it was demonstrated to them that the state 
interest superseded that of the person and his privacy. There-
fore, wherever feasible such validation should precede a search 
or a seizure. Fully cognizant of the fact that it is not in all 
circumstances practical to insist that a warrant be firstly 
obtained the Supreme Court of Canada nevertheless held that a 
search or a seizure without a warrant is ipso facto (automatical-
ly) unreasonable. In addition, the Court held that a warrantless 
seizure places an onus on the Crown to show that the search for 
it and the seizure itself were "reasonable" within the meaning of 
s. 8. of the Charter. 
3. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter being supreme 
law means that the validity of legislation that empowers investi-
gators to search without warrant or on the authority of persons 
who hold a certain office, can be tested. Whether the person who 
is empowered to authorize a search is a member of the judiciary 
is not important, as long as he is in a position to act judici-
ally. That means he or she must be impartial in the matter. If 
that person is part of the investigative branch which is seeking 
the authorization that hardly meets that test. In other words, 
he or she must be neutral and detached. Therefore a search 
authorized by the provisions of the Combines Investigation Act 
(as explained above) is unreasonable and those provisions are 
inconsistent with section 8 of the Charter and are, therefore, of 
no force and effect. 
Any statutory scheme for prior authorization must not only allow 
the issuer of the authorization to investigate the probability 
that the property to be searched for is at the location to be 
searched, but must compel him to do so. 
The question asked of the Supreme Court of Canada was if the 
provisions of the Combines Investigation Act under which the 
search of the Edmonton Journal was authorized were of no force or 
effect. The answer was a unanimous and resounding "Yes". 
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Comment: 
This judgement will undoubtedly have a considerable ripple effect. It 
is a quantum departure from what was established at common law and 
from what the Courts had to say about section 8 up until now. I 
hardly know where to begin my speculations and predictions. Firstly, 
I believe that all the theories that s. 8 did not apply to the Privacy 
Act and the interceptions of private communications may have been 
erroneous. If the section is intended not only to protect property 
but persons and/ or their privacy, this, no doubt, includes their 
communication. Furthermore warrants under the Criminal Code can be 
issued for buildings, receptacles and places. The latter means geo-
graphical places and there seems nothing to prevent warrants from 
being issued for a street or any other public place. Since a warrant-
less search or seizure is by its very nature unreasonable unless the 
Crown shows otherwise, this leaves one pondering if warrants must now 
be obtained for seizures police have customarily made without a 
warrant. It also leaves one wondering if proof of reasonable search 
is now an ingredient to the crime alleged against an accused? 
It must be remembered that the Supreme Court of Canada did not deal 
with the exclusionary rule (s. 24(2) Charter), but did simply say that 
no warrantless search is reasonable unless the Crown shows it is. 
This means that what the B. c. Court of Appeal established in Collins* 
in respect to infringements of rights vis-a-vis the exclusionary rule 
is now no longer valid, where the infringement is an unreasonable 
search on account of it being warrantless. The Supreme Court did not 
go so far as to say that the Crown has to prove in criminal prosecu-
tions that there were no infringements of freedoms or rights during 
the investigation. In cases other than those in which a warrantless 
search is involved, we should assume that the Collins precedent still 
stands, that is that the accused, to trigger consideration under the 
exclusionary rule, must show on the balance of probabilities that his 
rights or freedoms were inf ringed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada said that if there are statutory provi-
sions for a person to authorize a search, then the test of validity 
of those provisions depends on whether that person can act judici-
ally. This may well be the judicial death blow** to the writs of 
assistance issued under the Narcotics Control Act and the Customs and 
Excise Act. These documents "shall" be issued by the Federal Court 
upon the application of the competent minister. This means that the 
Judge is acting administratively and not judicially when he issues 
this licence to search. After all, the judge has no discretion in the 
matter. 
* * * * * 
* See Volume 12, page 1 of this publication. 
** A legislative one is promised by the Minister of Justice. 
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IMPLIED THREAT AND ROBBERY 
Regina v. Tardiff, County Court of Vancouver, Registry No. CC840163 -
October 1984. 
The accused who visibly wore a sheath knife on his hip, went into a 
store, ordered the cashier to open the till, and give him a paper 
bag. The victim complied and the accused grabbed approximately $370 
after which he fled on foot while followed by the store owner to an 
apartment block. 
Defence counsel argued that what the accused did amounts to theft but 
not robbery, in that there was no violence or threats of violence to 
the victim. In support of his submission he drew the Court's 
attention to a case* where a charge of robbery was reduced to the 
included offence of theft. The perpetrator in that case had put an 
empty shopping bag in front of the teller and said, "Put the money 
in. This is no joke". The teller had simply replied that she, the 
accused, was at the wrong wicket. She, saying "I don't care", moved 
to a different wicket where she was successful because the teller felt 
threatened and did comply. Another Ontario case** with similar 
results in respect to the Court's decision, was discussed. The 
accused, wearing ski-mask said to a laundromat attendant, "Give me all 
the money in cash". She promptly started to cry out of fear. The 
accused had then in a polite way and in a normal tone of voice assured 
the victim that he had no intention of hurting her and that all he was 
after was the money. 
Defence counsel in this case argued that since the visible sheath 
knife was not referred to or touched, the coincidence that the accused 
was wearing this implement (which is not unlawful) ought not to be of 
any consequence in respect to the alleged offence. The knife was in 
the circumstances not a "weapon" and therefore the accused was not 
armed. 
Crown Counsel argued that when the accused committed the theft of 
money he was armed with an offensive weapon as he had equipped himself 
with the knife and wore it visibly to intimidate and threaten his 
victim. He asked the Court to follow a decision by the B. c. Court of 
Appealt. In relation to the issue whether a person is armed at the 
time of a theft the court had held that conduct is a significant 
factor. The accused in that case had "played out a pantomime to give 
* R. v. Thierbault (1981) 61 CCC (2nd) 175 
** R. v. Letourneau and Rochon - Unreported - April 1982 
t R. v. Sloan (1974) 19 CCC (2d) 190 
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the impression that he had a weapon" and as a consequence he was 
charged with robbery in that he couunitted theft while armed with a 
weapon. The Court held that he could not be convicted as charged 
although his conduct might have justified a conviction of robbery 
using threats of violence or assaulting his victim (see definition of 
assault). 
In this case the accused, like the accused in the case decided by the 
B. c. Court of Appeal, was charged with theft while armed with an 
offensive weapon. The accused visibly wore a knife while his histori-
cal counterpart only made his victim believe he was armed. This 
begged the question if (considering that many items may and can be 
used as a weapon) any tool or piece of clothing may be considered to 
be an offensive weapon when worn by the perpetrator during the 
couunission of a theft. 
The most frequently referred to case when defence counsel attempts to 
argue that there is doubt that theft amounted to robbery, is that of 
a man giving a bank teller in Victoria, B. C. a paper bag with the 
words "empty your till" written on it. The trial judge held that the 
words amounted to a demand that, coupled with the man's conduct, 
should be regarded as a threat. What in essence was said was "empty 
your till - or else". In other words, the conduct is of utmost 
importance. 
The "or else" was also strongly implied in this case. 
Accused convicted of robbery. 
Comment: The County Court Judge obviously stayed away from finding 
that the accused was armed despite the fact that the charge alleged 
stealing while armed. He simply found as a fact that the knife was 
visibly worn. The knife, the words spoken, and the general conduct of 
the accused had given the victim reasonable and probable grounds to 
fear from the implied threat. In a way the knife became part of the 
conduct. 
It seems that the question whether the accused was armed is a dif fi-
cult one; as difficult as determining whether a person commits assault 
by being armed (see section 244(l)(c) C.C.). To beg, accost or impede 
anyone while openly carrying a weapon amounts to assault. This sub-
section was inserted in the mid seventies to discourage aggressive 
begging. I cannot recall reading a case where someone was charged 
with assault as defined in this section. It is obvious what Parlia-
ment attempted to remedy, but I believe it will fail to be remedial. 
The definition of "weapon" is predicted to cause the problem. 
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What intimidates the victim of this sort of assault are the knives, 
chains, belts and buckles and whatever other paraphernalia is worn by 
persons the section is aimed at. However, by definition, a weapon is 
something designed to be a weapon or anything intended to be used as 
such. What persuades the "beggee" to give an alm is what he or she 
believes may be used as a weapon while the law refers to what is in 
the mind of the "beggar". What is a kitchen utensil, a pants-holder-
upper, or an ornament to the rambler and beggar is a weapon to the 
"beggee". It seems from the cases explored in this case, that when 
this section 244(l)(c) c.c. fits the scenario the act amounts to 
robbery. 
In essence, this definition of assault attempts to remedy something 
that is "in the eye of the beholder" while the definition of weapon 
addresses what is in the mind of the perpetrator. 
It seems that when an alm is obtained because of ••the weapon" worn by 
the begger, the so-called begging amounts to robbery. If this is not 
so then, facetiously speaking, all the accused in this case had to do 
was add "please" to the words he spoke to the teller and his act would 
have amounted to no more than assault. 
* * * * * 
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ARBITRARY DETENTION 
Not Releasing an Impaired Driver when There is no 
Apparent Further Need for Custody 
The Queen v. Mcintosh, B. C. Court of Appeal, B.C.C.A. 002074, 
September 1984. 
The accused was, on appeal, acquitted in County Court of "over 80 
mlg." (see page 20 of Volume 16 of this publication). He was 
considered to have been co-operative all through the investigation and 
had requested, at its conclusion, to be permitted to make arrangements 
for transportation home. Although he had apparently no grounds for so 
believing, the officer testified that the accused just might have 
returned to his car and driven again. He, therefore decided to place 
the accused in cells where he was held from 22:30 hours until 9: 10 
hours the following day. Expert testimony showed that considering the 
reading obtained, the accused was considered sober at 3:00 hours, and 
it was clear that none of the other grounds under s. 450(2)(d) c.c. 
existed to continue the custody of the accused. 
The County Court Judge had found that the accused had been arbitrarily 
detained and had concluded that acquittal was the appropriate remedy 
for this infringement of the accused's right (s. 24(1) Charter). The 
Crown appealed this decision. 
Regrettably the B. c. Court of Appeal did not get to deal with the 
propriety of acquitting the accused as a remedy to the infringement. 
To do so the Court had to find firstly that there was an infringement 
of the accused's right. Surprisingly, the justices found that in 
these circumstances, there was no such violation. Furthermore the 
application of the circumstances as ~elated in the reasons for 
judgement by the B. C. Court of Appeal is less slanted towards arbi-
trary detention than that by the County Court. 
Firstly, everyone including the accused was complimentary about the 
Constable's handling of the investigation. He had been fair, polite 
and treated the accused well; he had been forthright in his evidence 
and was described as a credible witness with impressive experience in 
apprehension of impaired drivers. 
When cross examined why he had not allowed the accused to go home by 
taxi or to be picked up by his wife, the Constable had responded: 
" ••• most drivers who find themselves in this situation will say 
anything to get out of the police office"; 
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a person has to be reasonably sober to understand the 
appearance notice"; 
"... accused persons under similar conditions and the person 
released has gone back to the vehicle and committed the same 
offence"; 
accused persons fail to appear in accordance with the 
provisions of the appearance notice and the court has held the 
person was too drunk to understand the appearance notice"; 
... I could not convince myself he would not have driven"; 
... I had doubts he would try other means to get home and would 
drive". 
When asked more specifically why he had locked the accused up the 
constable had testified: 
"The accused was retained to prevent a repetition of the 
offence"; 
"Solely because he was drunk"; 
"I could not release him in that condition"; 
"I do not know what he would have done. I would not take that 
chance". 
The County Court Judge had labelled these reasons as mere speculation 
on the part of the officer and falling short of continuing the custody 
on reasonable and probable grounds that the public interest was not 
satisfied. 
The B. c. Court of Appeal, as stated above, only addressed whether the 
test of public interest under section 452(l)(f) c.c. had been met. As 
they found that it had been, the justices needed not to answer the 
more interesting Charter questions. The Justices' views can best be 
related by quoting the highlights of their reasons for judgement. 
Acknowledging that the onus is on the Crown to establish that the 
conditions prerequisite to continued custody have been met, the Court 
said: 
"The fact is that the constable was faced with a man who 
admittedly was drunk and unfit to drive, and starting from 
that point it was reasonable for him to view the matter by 
asking whether he could meet the conditions which make it in 
the public interest for him to be released". 
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The B. C. Court of Appeal said that the County Court Judge had erred 
in law when he held that the reasons given for not releasing the 
accused amounted to mere speculation and that therefore the custody 
was arbitrary. The Justices said: 
"The constable had regiird for the facts, particularly to the 
condition of the accused and to his own experience and that 
of other officers in dealing with similar cases •••• Indeed, 
it was open to him to draw on the knowledge which all of us 
have with regard to these matters". 
In addressing the submission that the accused had been co-operative 
and had not in words or demeanor given the constable any grounds for 
believing that he would drive again that night and that frequently 
experienced propensities on the part of impaired persons could not be 
considered grounds for keeping this accused locked up, the Court said: 
"That was irrelevant to the question of whether he could, 
with due regard to the public interest be released.... The 
implication seems to be that the Provincial Court Judge 
could have regard only to the conduct and words of the 
accused in determining whether the officer was justified in 
reaching the conclusion he did under section 452. That too, 
in my view, is wrong in law". 
Relating what, in their view, the accused himself had provided to the 
constable's grounds justifying the continuation of the custody was his 
drunkenness and his being "adamant" to get home. Said the Court: 
"That was most germane to the question whether there was a 
risk of him repeating the offence". 
The B. C. Court of Appeal explained their reference to "a risk" of a 
repetition of the offence. That question must be viewed on whether 
there is a risk of that occurring or that the officer could be certain 
that it would not occur. ~ 
"It does not matter that the risk in statistical terms may 
be small. The risk which the Constable had to be concerned 
about was not merely that of the repetition of the offence. 
The more important risk was that of the serious consequences 
which might have ensued had the accused resumed control of 
his vehicle on that night". 
Having explored the possible consequences, including the loss of life 
of an innocent bystander, the Court of Appeal said: 
"Would it then have seemed reasonable for the officer, 
perhaps in defending himself in disciplinary or civil 
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proceedings that would surely have ensued, to say that he 
was doing his duty under the . Charter. T think not. The 
Constable was carrying out his clear duty in ensuing that 
such disaster could not occur. The Charter in protecting 
individual rights, does not require that the public interest 
be neglected". 
The issue of the custody being extended beyond the time at which, by a 
simple calculation it is reasonable to assume the accused was sober 
again was not raised at the accused's trial. Therefore there was 
insufficient facts known to make the decision that the custody after 
that point in time was arbitrary. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Conviction restored. 
Comment: It would seem quite impertinent for me to write reasons why 
I think this binding precedent for B. c. will have a life span equal 
to this case or another like it, reaching the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In other words, I am predicting that these welcomed views of 
our B. c. Justices will not survive an appeal. For one thing, I do 
not believe that the propensities of some fellow citizen are reason-
able and probable grounds to keep another citizen in custody where he 
personally has not indicated to do anything contrary to the public 
interest. With due respect, I think the Supreme Court of Canada would 
reason similarly to the County Court Tudge who dealt with the first 
appeal and said there were no such grounds in relation to the 
accused. He had held that there was nothing more than suspicion and 
conjecture. However, the case raises numerous interesting questions 
in respect to arbitrary detention. The most basic one of which is its 
meaning. However, finding that the constable's reasons for continuing 
the accused's detention withstood the test of "public interest" as 
defined in the Criminal Code, the Court did not have to deal with that 
issue. 
* * * * * 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF BREATH ANALYSES WITHOUT EVIDENCE 
OF SUSPECT HAVING BEEN INFORMED OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Regina v. Copley, County Court of Vancouver, No. CC 830036. 
The accused was acquitted of "over 80 mlg.". Breath samples had been 
taken on demand but no evidence was adduced by anyone that the accused 
had been informed of her right to counsel. The trial judge had taken 
the position that the Crown's failure to show that section 10 of the 
Charter had been complied with, was evidence of an infringement of the 
accused's right which was fat al to the acceptance of the analyses 
evidence (s. 24(2) Charter). The Crown appealed the acquittal on the 
grounds that: (l) the accused was not "detained" at the time the 
samples were taken; (2) there was no infringement and in any event the 
accused should have shown on the balance of probabilities that there 
was an infringement; and (3) if there was an infringement the 
admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
The first question the Court had to deal with, of course, was whether 
the accused, when she gave the breath samples, was "detained". If so, 
the officer had been obliged to inform the accused of her right to 
counsel. The officer had testified that as far as he was concerned 
the accused was detained. He came to this conclusion as he would not 
have let her leave if she had been so inclined, and the fact that he 
had to use "verbal force", to get her to accompany him. He had not 
arrested her. 
The appropriate answer to the question whether a person · in these 
circumstances is detained, still "floats" among the judiciary. On 
this issue, many apply or find comfort from a decision by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in 1980*. In that case the suspect was demanded to 
give a sample of breath in a roadside screening device and was 
therefore not obliged to accompany the officer. Some judges feel that 
that distincts that case from those where one must accompany police. 
Others express the opinion that the case is no longer a valid test to 
determine if the suspect was detained as it was argued under the Bill 
of Rights. Although the wording in regard to right to counsel is 
nearly identical to that in the Charter, they feel that the latter 
being the supreme law of Canada, must receive greater consideration 
than the provision under the Bill of Rights. The 1980 Supreme Court 
of Canada decision was that a person is not detained by simply 
complying with a legal obligation, but that detention is determined by 
the physical restraint placed on the person. Yet judges have found 
that handcuffed impaired driving suspects, transported in secured 
police vehicles were not detained as long as they had not been 
arrested, but were only under demand to provide samples of breath. 
* R. v. Chromiac 49 c.c.c. (2d) 257 - Also see page 3 of Volume l 
of this publication. 
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The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal* held in 1983 that a person who is 
under demand to accompany a police officer, is detain~d. The Ontario 
and Alberta Courts of Appeal seem to have disagreed with their 
Saskatchewan counterpart. 
In B. c., the matter has not reached (to the best of my knowledge) the 
Court of Appeal yet and this County Court Judge was pretty well 
obliged to follow the precedent he himself set on this issue, in R. 
v. Leemhuis**. He had followed the reasoning by the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal. 
This County Court Judge expressed the view that to consider that there 
is no "detention" until there is a form of custody that is reviewable 
by means of habeas corpus would mean that detention is the equivalent 
of a custody after arrest. Said the Judge: 
"With respect to state that detention means some form of 
compulsory restraint by process of law is not realistic". 
He concluded that the accused was "detained" when she gave her samples 
of breath. 
As stated above, there was no evidence that the accused was informed 
of her rights and from this the trial judge had concluded that she had 
not been informed and hence her rights had been inf ringed. The Crown 
objected to this logic and submitted that the onus is not on the Crown 
to show that the Charter had been complied with. The County Court 
responded that there was no evidence of compliance with the Charter 
and the onus was on the police officer to do so. It was concluded 
that the accused's right had been infringed. 
Then the County Court considered if the administration of justice 
would be brought into disrepute if the evidence obtained by this 
infringement was admitted. The Court instructed itself that the onus 
is on the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that such 
disrepute would result and held that the accused had failed to do so. 
* R. v. Therens 5 CCC (3d) 409 
** R. v. Leemhuis X010247 New Westminster Registry 
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This case was one of "inadvertence" ·on the part of the police and "the 
community would not be shocked" by the conduct of the police in this 
case . No unfair advantage was taken. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
New trial ordered. 
Comment: This case was decided long before the Supreme Court of 
Canada gave reasons for judgement in Hunter v. Southam (See page 12). 
Therefore, the Court's decision that the absence of evidence to the 
contrary by the Crown was sufficient to show that a detained person's 
rights were violated, could not have derived from the decision by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. It dictates that any warrantless search is 
unreasonable unless the Crown shows that it was otherwise. One could 
advance an argument that the Southam decision means that the Crown is 
obliged to show that there were no infringements of any rights or 
freedoms during an investigation and that in the absence of such proof 
(the burden of which may well be beyond a reasonable doubt) all evi-
dence derived from such presumed infringements is subject to the test 
on whether admission would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. Legal opinions are that the Supreme Court of Canada did 
only deal with warrantless searches and did not say that proof of 
absence of violation of rights or freedoms is prerequisite to the 
Crown's case being prima f acie. In any event this County Court 
decision was prior to the Southam decision and it seems the judge 
applied what would be the interpretation of that case most adverse to 
the Crown. The procedure established by the B. c. Court of Appeal* 
was apparently not followed. Assuming that these decisions are still 
binding in B. C. in relation to violation of rights or freedoms other 
than in cases of warrant less searches, then they stipulate that to 
trigger consideration for the exclusion of evidence the accused must 
show that on the balance of probabilities his rights or freedoms were 
infringed. 
The "detention debate" will no doubt continue until an appropriate 
post Charter case reaches the Supreme Court of Canada. However, I 
will try my hand at a prediction. The Court will hold that being 
under a legal obligation to do something, does not, by itself render a 
person being detained. The measure of physical restraint and being 
held in custody will determine whether or not there is detention. 
Actually this is not much of a prediction as it is the pre-Charter 
Chromiac decision in a nutshell. Many Courts have continued to apply 
this test to determine whether a person should have been informed of 
his right to counsel. 
* Regina v. Collins and Regina v. Cohen CA 821232 and CA821475 
respectively 1983. Also see page 1 of Volume 12 of this publica-
tion. 
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Police officers are inclined to apply a pretty safe test themselves . 
The officer testified that he would not have let the accused go if she 
had been inclined to leave. He determined by that test that the 
accused was detained and did so testify. This test is safe but 
probably not conclusive. It may also depend on whether the matter of 
detention will receive an objective or subjective test. It will, 
regardless of the officer's opinion, remain a matter for the Court to 
decide on. 
* * * * * 
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"AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE" and HUMANITARIANISM 
Regina v. Robinson, County Court of Westminster, New Westminster 
Registry No. X81-7085. 
The accused appealed his conviction of "over 80 mlg." 
The accused was involved in an accident in which his wife was 
injured. The attending constable had, immediately upon arrival at the 
scene, observed all the symptoms of impairment but failed to make the 
demand as the accused was seemingly sincerely concerned about his 
wife's condition. The officer stood by while he conversed with the 
ambulance crew and then drove the accused to the hospital allowing him 
to be with his wife for about 20 minutes. When he was assured his 
wife would be alright, the constable made a demand of the accused for 
samples of his breath. 
The accused now argued that the delay in making the demand was fatal 
to accepting the certificate of analyses. He claimed that the demand 
should have been made at the scene and that humaneness could not be 
allowed to interfere with a strict compliance of the law. The demand 
simply had not been made as soon as practicable as s. 237 c.c. 
dictates . 
Said the County Court Judge : 
"Police Officers, in doing their duty, should not be 
discouraged from a reasonable and humane concern for the 
feelings of others by a necessity for servile adherence to 
absolute technicality and justice should not be thwarted by 
their having done so". 




* * * * * 
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UNREASONABLE SEARCH - GOOD FAITH 
R. v. Leveillee, B. C. Court of Appeal, No. 831359, September 1984. 
The accused was stopped for speeding. The officer who did not know 
him thought that the accused just may have drugs on him and asked: 
"What is your record for"? The accused answered to be on probation 
for possession of hash for the purpose of trafficking. 
The questioning continued and the accused assured the officer he had 
nothing on him he should not have. The inevitable question: "You 
don't mind then if I take a look, do you?" was replied to in silence 
by taking his hands out of his pockets and holding them out in front 
of him. This was taken as not only a consent but also an invitation 
to a body search. A small ball of foil was found in a film cannister 
in the accused's pocket. When asked what the ball contained the 
accused said: "Hash, it's mine". 
The accused testified that his gesture was in no way intended to 
convey consent, but exasperation with what was happening. This had 
not been accepted by the trial judge and the accused's defence that 
the search was done without the prerequisite reasonable and probable 
grounds for the officer to believe that he had a narcotic in his 
possession and without his consent, rendered it unreasonable. He 
claimed the search amounted to an infringement of his right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure and the narcotic found 
on him should not be admitted in evidence. As his gesture was 
accepted as giving consent to the search, the trial judge had held 
there was no infringement of rights and the evidence was admitted and 
the accused convicted. He appealed the conviction. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal said that it was not important if the 
accused consented to the search. His gesture was in good faith inter-
preted as giving consent to the search. The officer had not "acted 
carelessly, maliciously or in deliberate defiance of the rights of the 
accused person". Therefore, assuming the search was in fact without 
the accused's consent, the administration of justice would, because of 
good faith on the part of the officer, not be brought into disrepute. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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ADVERSE WITNESS PROCEDURE 
Regina v. Booth, B. C. Court of Appeal, Vancouver Registry C.A. 
001743. 
This case is about thieves who sold their ill-gotten goods to the 
accused who painted the tools so they could not be readily recog-
nized. When one of the thieves was in the stand to testify for the 
Crown, he seemed to struggle with premature senility as he could 
remember hardly anything that was inculpatory in regards to the 
accused. To say the least, the Crown had an evasive witness on its 
hands and applied under the provisions of the Canada Evidence Act 
for permission to cross examine its own witness. The trial judge, in 
response, directed the witness to read the written statement he had 
given to the police during the investigation, and asked some specific 
questions from the witness. He concluded: "It was lack of recall" 
and expressed the opinion that the witness would have been entitled to 
read his statement to refresh his memory prior to testifying, so why 
should he not be allowed to read it while in the stand for the same 
purpose? The judge then said to Crown counsel "... carry on from 
there, Mr. Goodfellow". This resulted in testimony which incriminated 
the accused. 
What may be of interest for police investigators is the use of 
statements from witnesses during a trial. When testimony is 
inconsistent with a statement the witness gave previously, the 
question is whether the cause is "flurry or forgetfulness". If there 
is an honest inability to recall, the crown witness is not legally 
adverse and the prosecutor should be allowed to put the witness back 
on the tracks by either a leading question or allowing the witness to 
read their previous statement. In such circumstances, there is no 
need to discredit one's own witness. When the lack to recall is 
suspected to be derived from being adverse to the interest of the 
party who called the witness (can also be the defence) the party may 
apply to the trial Court (section 9(2) Can. Evidence Act) to cross 
examine his or her own witness. By judicial law-making a procedure 
for this was established in 1971*. 
1. The party who wishes to cross examine their own witness must make 




If there is a jury, it must retire and a voir dire must be 
conducted to determine whether or not the witness is adverse; 
R. v. Milgaard 2 c.c.c. (2d) 206 
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3. The applicant must then make the court aware what in particular 
between the testimony and the previous written statement, is 
inconsistent; 
4. The trial judge must read the statement and rule whether there is 
an inconsistency; 
5. If he finds there is not, that ends the matter; if he finds there 
is an inconsistency he must call on the applicant to prove that 
the statement was made by the witness which must be done by 
calling witnesses in the event the witness refuses to admit 
having made the statement; and 
6. If at the conclusion of the voir dire the trial is satisfied that 
it was indeed the witness' statement, he must recall the jury and 
he may allow the applicant to cross-examine his or her own 
witness. 
In this case that procedure was not followed. Defence counsel had 
objected when the trial judge, in response to the Crown's application 
allowed the witness to read his statement and then carry on with the 
trial. This was the ground for appealing the accused's conviction. 
Crown counsel, can assumed to have claimed that the trial judge had 
decided the witness was not adverse but simply had a lack of recall 
and remedied the situation by letting the witness read his previous 
statement. However, it is not too clear what was held. 
The Court of Appeal reminded that the witness was an accomplice and 
that the evidence he gave was inconsistent with his previous state-
ment. Therefore, the trial judge should have made a decision if the 
witness was adverse. Resolving the doubt in favour of the accused the 
Court of Appeal held that the trial judge probably held the witness 
was adverse and used the wrong procedure. In any event he did not 
have a fair trial. 
As the Crown was not interested in a new trial, the Court quashed the 
conviction for possession of stolen property. 
Comment: Some refer to an adverse witness as a hostile witness. Some 
of our judiciary claim that for all intents and purposes there is no 
difference but others have held that they are quite distinct from one 
another. 
For instance, if on a certain issue a witness is apparently adverse to 
the interest of the party that called him, and the testimony is incon-
sistent with a previous statement, then if the trial judge concludes 
that the witness is indeed adverse, he may be cross-examined by the 
party that called him. However, such examination is restricted to 
that portion of the testimony that is inconsistent with the previous 
statement. 
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If the witness in addition, does show in his general demeanor and/or 
deportment that he is hostile towards the party that called him, then 
all of his testimony is subject to cross-examination. 
It should also be remembered that a witness who did not make a 
previous statement does testify that he does not recall anything he 
may well be adverse to the interest of the party that called him, but 
that by itself does not make him an adverse witness. 
* * * * * 
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HOW TO PROVE THAT THERE IS 15 MINUTES 
BETWEEN THE TAKING OF SAMPLES OF BREATH 
Regina v. Moore, B. C. Court of Appeal, No. 001604, 19'84. 
In May of 1983, the Ontario Court of Appeal held* that a certificate 
of analysis under s. 237 c.c. that records two points in time that are 
more than 15 minutes apart in respect to the taking of breath samples 
is no proof that they were taken "with an interval of at least fifteen 
minutes". The Ontario Court of Appeal reasoned that the words mean 
that there must be at least 15 clear minutes between completing the 
first analysis and commencing the second one, and it should be so 
certified. Unless this was clearly stated, no certificate can be 
accepted held the Court, not even if the times that the suspect blew 
is certified to be apart in excess of 15 minutes. 
Some courts in B. c. and other provinces have felt obligated to follow 
the opinion expressed by the Ontario Court of Appeal even though the 
ruling was not binding on them (with the exception of these Courts in 
Ontario, of course). Acquittals have resulted. However, the Alberta 
Court of Appeal expressed disagreement with its Ontario counterpart**; 
now in the Moore case the B. c. Court of Appeal joined the view of 
their Alberta brothers. They reminded that s. 237(l)(d) c.c. 
stipulates that the analyst's certificate is evidence of its 
contents. Quoting from the Alberta decision, the B. c. Court of 
Appeal said: 
"Therefore, a statement in the certificate that one sample 
was taken at a certain time and a second sample was taken 15 
minutes later is conclusive and final ••• ". "The Criminal 
Code does not require that the certificate of analysis 
'should clellly state the time in which the taking of the 
first sample was completed and the time at which the taking 
of the second sample was commenced'". 
(Emphasis is mine). 
Accused convicted. 
Comment: The Criminal Justice Branch of the B. C. Ministry of 
Attorney General did taylor our certificates to the Taylor decision. 
This is now excessive but safe. It is not believed that a certificate 
that states, for instance, that samples were taken at 03:00 and 03:15 
* R. v. Taylor 7 c.c.c. (3d) 293. Also page 26 of Volume 14 of 
this publication. 
** R. v. Karnak (1984) 51 A.L.R. 93. 
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hours is evidence of a 15 minute interval . There are still the cases 
that deal with the calculation of time* and establish that "3 o'clock" 
is a time of no duration. In other words it does not stay 3 o'clock 
until 03:01 hours. Therefore, seconds are of importance and a 
certificate, as they used to be, should indicate times calculated on 
that basis. Without such evidence the presumption that the blood 
alcohol level at the time of driving and a t the time of analyses is 
the same, is simply lost.** 
* * * * * 
R. v. Davis 32 C.C.C. (2d) 459 - R. v. Steiger 32 C.C.C. (2d) 461 
- R. v. Tremble 1 W.W.R. [1977] 575. 
** R. v. Chapman 24 M.V.R. 290 
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
THE DRIVER'S LICENCE IS SUSPENDED (M.V.A.) 
The Queen and Johnson, B. C. Supreme Courts Vancouver Registry No. 
CC840173, July 1984. 
The accused was found driving his car on a day the Superintendent of 
Motor Vehicles certified was included in a period of time the accused 
was prohibited from driving a motor vehicle. 
The accused plead not guilty and did not adduce any evidence in his 
defence. The Crown introduced evidence of the driving and presented 
the Superintendent's certificate to prove the prohibition and the 
accused's knowledge of it. In regards to the latter the prosecutor 
depended on the presumption of knowledge under section 88(2) of the 
B. c. Motor Vehicle Act. This subsection provides that the Superin-
tendent's certificate is proof of knowledge on the part of the accused 
that he was so suspended or prohibited, unless he proves on the 
balance of probabilities that he did not know. 
Defence counsel unsuccessfully submitted that the presumption of 
knowledge was contrary to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, particu-
larly in respect to the presumption of innocence. The accused 
appealed by means of stated case and was successful. The Supreme 
Court Justice applied the constitutional test to this presumption of 
knowledge. The Courts have reasoned that the prerequisite facts and 
the presumption must be a natural flow. In other words, if the 
prerequisite circumstances or facts exist, then the fact to be 
presumed must be a probability. For instance, when the presumption of 
care or control (section 237 C.C.) was tested, the Courts held that it 
is probable that someone who occupies the driver's seat of a car has 
the care or control of it. 
The Court held that it hardly, naturally flowed from the fact that the 
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles signed a suspension certificate that 
the person mentioned in that certificate has knowledge of the suspen-
sion. Therefore, s. 88(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, which allows that 
presumption is arbitrary and inconsistent with the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (s. ll(d)). 
Appeal Allowed. 
S. 88(2) M.V.A. struck down. 
Accused acquitted. 
• • • • • 
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DOES AN AUTHORIZATION TO INTERCEPT PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS 
INCLUDE THE POWER TO ENTER PLACES TO INSTALL THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT? 
In synopses of opposing reasons for judgement by the Alberta and 
Ontario Courts of Appeal, I have explained why the former said "No" 
and the latter "Yes" to this important question*. 
Apparently a majority decision on this issue was handed down by the 
Supreme Court of Canada (believed to be an appeal of the Alberta 
decision). It held that an authorization to intercept a private 
communication includes authority to enter places for the purpose of 
installing, repairing, removing or monitoring the necessary equipment. 
I have not yet received a copy of the reasons for judgement. Look for 
an explanation in our next volume. 
* * * * * 
* Volume 17, page 11 of this publication. 
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THE WRONG DEAL? 
AGENT PROVOCATEUR NOT AVAILABLE TO TESTIFY 
Regina v. Ross County Court of Westminster, No. X829640 New 
Westminster Registry. 
The accused was charged with trafficking heroin as a result of a sale 
to a Cst. L. and a Ms. W. At his trial the following was cited as the 
facts: Police, in a drug enforcement operation, brought Cst. L. from 
the east to work undercover. A Ms. W., a drug addict, was recruited 
by the N.C.o. in charge of the operation to play the part of Cst. L.'s 
girlfriend. Cst. L. was "kept in the dark" about the arrangement 
between his Force and Ms. W. which was that she received a per diem 
rate and, for lack of a better word, a commission for each purchase of 
illicit drugs she arranged. She was at the conclusion of the opera-
tion to "absent herself" from the area and it was understood that she 
would not ever be required to testify. She did absent herself and she 
was not subpoened by the Crown. 
What is important to remember here is that Ms. W. was not an informant 
but an agent provocateur and a compellable witness for either side in 
this criminal dispute. The defence wanted the Crown to produce Ms. 
W. so she could be cross-examined or in the alternative subpoena her 
for the defence. The trial was adjourned and the Crown was instructed 
to provide defence counsel with all the available information on Ms. 
W.'s whereabouts. However, no information to locate her was 
available. She had phoned police six months prior to the trial to say 
she was living in the U. S., had kicked the habit and had .begun a new 
life. 
Ms. W. usually worked alone when persuading suppliers to make a sale 
to Cst. L. Due to the arrangement to pay a commission, it must be 
presumed, claimed defence counsel, that Ms. W. was extremely 
persuasive and anxious. The accused's testimony supported such 
importuning. Evidence showed that the accused Ross was originally not 
a target. However, Ms. W. was friendly with him years ago. Their 
friendship had a "certain degree of intimacy". He was then involved 
in trafficking and she decided to solicit him. She phoned him and 
suggested she'd come over to his apartment the following night to pick 
up where they had left off. The accused who claimed that he had been 
rehabilitated accepted the offer and was looking forward to the visit 
only to be disappointed as she brought Cst. L. with her. She asked 
the accused to arrange a supply of "a bundle" (25 caps of heroin) 
while L. was in the bathroom. The accused had refused and said he 
simply could not do so. A few days later the three met again and this 
time, according to the Constable, Ms. W. asked for "a bundle" in his 
presence. The accused said, "he'd look around" to see if he could 
find someone. The accused denied this and said Ms. W. had, by 
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herself, persisted he supply the caps. This pressure and his feeling 
of guilt for not helping her had made him contact some types from his 
previous lifestyle. There was evidence from defence witnesses that 
Ms. W. bothered the accused and would not leave him alone. A few days 
later Cst. L. and Ms. W. met the man who supplied "the bundle" to the 
accused who in turn sold it to Cst. L. Shortly after, in subsequent 
attempts for more purchases it became obvious that the underworld knew 
L. was a policeman and the operation was stopped. 
The accused claimed he was entrapped and was deprived of a fair trial 
as he could not cross examine or subpoena the party who had played a 
major role in the transaction that was the basis of the charge. 
The Court held that the Crown's lack to keep in touch with and produce 
as a witness Ms. w., infringed the accused's right to a fair trial. 
He was incapable to give a full answer to what the Crown alleged and 
that a stay of proceedings was an appropriate remedy for this 
infringement (s. 24(1) Charter). 
Secondly, the Court held that entrapment is now* a defence known to 
law, and that Ms. W. may well have entrapped the accused. 
Comment: Whether there exists a defence of entrapment in Canada has 
been an issue of debate. Our Courts have not hesitated to define 
entrapment to mean ensnaring, calculated inveigling or persistent 
importuning by authorities for a person to commit a crime he was not 
predisposed to commit. This does not include creating an opportunity 
for or persistent solicitation of a person who is predisposed to 
commit the crime. Flagrant cases of entrapment never used to result 
in acquittals but in judicial stays of procedure. Charges arising 
from entrapment are seen as an abuse of the process of the Court. 
In December of 1981 a Nova Scotia District Court Judge held that there 
exists a defence of entrapment** and acquitted a person charged with 
trafficking in marihuana. In August of 1982, the Supreme Court of 
Canada (in a 5 to 4 decision) reiterated in Amato v. The Queen the 
definition of entrapment but upheld Amato' s conviction as there had 
been no more than "persistent solicitation" on the part of police. 
* Amato v. The Queen (1982) 69 c.c.c. See also page 34 of Volume l 
and page 32 of Volume 8 of this publication. 
** R. v. Rippley 65 C.C.C. (2d), 158. 
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Said the Court: 
"In my view, it is only where police tactics are such as to 
leave no room for the formation of independent criminal 
intent by the accused that the question of entrapment can 
enter into the determination of his guilt or innocence". 
Some are of the opinion that the Amato judgement has recognized 
entrapment as a defence. Others feel the Supreme Court of Canada 
simply reiterated its definition and held that the circumstances in 
Amato did not amount to entrapment and that the process of the Court 
was not abused. 
Obviously the Judge of the County Court of Westminster who decided on 
this Ross case is of the opinion that there is now a defence- of 
entrapment. Yet he stayed the proceedings instead of acquitting the 
accused. 
* * * * * 
